early 1990s toward greater concentration of total U.S. deposits among the largest banks. 2 Federal law prohibits any bank from obtaining more than 10 percent of total U.S. deposits or more than 30 percent of a single state's total deposits by acquiring other non-failed banks, and some states have imposed even lower deposit share limits. 3 Further, antitrust enforcement prevents mergers of non-failed banks that would significantly increase the concentration of local banking markets. However, antitrust policy does not (i) prevent acquisitions of failed banks that increase local market concentration or (ii) attempt to limit increases in concentration that do not result from mergers. Nonetheless, during the 1990s, local urban banking markets generally did not become significantly more concentrated, despite increases in the deposit shares of the largest U.S. and regional banks (Amel, 1996, and Dick, 2006) .
Banking industry consolidation has since continued, spurred in part by the recent financial crisis and recession. This article examines changes since 1999 in the concentration of U.S. banking markets, defined both at the local level (metropolitan statistical areas [MSAs] and non-MSA rural counties) and at the Census-region level. It examines whether the characteristics of urban and regional banking markets observed during the 1990s continued over the subsequent decade. The article focuses in particular on the years 2006-10 to gauge whether trends in banking market structures continued during the financial crisis and recession. The resolution of failed banks during 2007-10 did not increase the concentration of most local banking markets (Wheelock, 2011) . However, unassisted mergers accounted for more of the decline in the number of U.S. banks during 2007-10 than did bank failures, and therefore potentially had a larger impact on the structures of banking markets.
Following the approach of Dick (2006) , this article uses both the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the number of dominant firms in a market-that is, the minimum number of banks that, combined, hold at least 50 percent of a market's total deposits-to measure market concentration. However, unlike Dick (2006) , this article examines trends in the concentration of rural banking markets as well as MSAs, and it includes both commercial banks and savings institutions in the analysis of market concentration (for comparison, the article also reports results for commercial banks only). 4 Further, the article investigates the impact of unassisted mergers on banking market concentration during 2007-10. The results show that, in general, local banking markets did not become significantly more concentrated during 2006-10 but, as Dick (2006) finds for the 1990s, concentration increased markedly at the level of U.S. Census regions.
The next section investigates trends in bank deposit concentration for both local banking markets (MSAs and rural counties) and Census regions. The following section examines trends in the number of dominant banks, again at the levels of local banking markets and Census regions. Subsequently, the article examines the impact of unassisted mergers during 2007-10 on the concentration of deposits for MSAs and rural counties. The final section provides study conclusions.
BANKING CONCENTRATION: LOCAL AND REGIONAL PATTERNS
The recent decline in the number of U.S. banks has continued a trend dating back to the mid-1980s (Figure 1 ). Hundreds of banks failed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many more were absorbed through unassisted mergers, spurred by the relaxation of legal restrictions on bank 
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2 In both 1984 and 1993, the 10 largest banks held 15 percent of total U.S. bank deposits. However, by 1999, the 10 largest banks held 28 percent of total U.S. bank deposits. These data are for December 31 of the year indicated for U.S. commercial banks located in the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
3 Caps on deposit shares were imposed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Adequately capitalized banks may exceed the caps by acquiring failing or FDICassisted banks. Banks may also exceed the caps through internally generated growth. See Spong (2000) for additional details.
branching by many states and the federal government (Amel, 1996) . 5 The number of U.S. commercial banks reached a post-World War II peak of 14,495 banks in 1984. By the end of 2010, the number had fallen to 6,532. Similarly, the number of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-insured savings institutions fell from 3,566 to 1,128 over the same period (the number of savings institutions peaked at 3,740 in 1986). Despite an increase in the share of total U.S. deposits held by the very largest banks, the concentration of deposits among banks in local markets changed little, on average, from the mid-1980s through the 1990s (Amel, 1996, and Dick, 2006) . Furthermore, the advent of interstate bank branching in 1997 had little immediate impact on either local banking market concentration or state-level measures of banking market competition (Dick, 2006, and Yildirim and Mohanty, 2010) . 6 Bank regulators use Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines for market concentration to evaluate the competitive effects of proposed bank mergers and acquisitions. Proposed transactions that would substantially increase market concentration are subject to more scrutiny and are more likely to be rejected on antitrust grounds than transactions that would not increase concentration significantly. Regulators use data on deposits held by individual bank branch offices, which banks are required to report on June 30 of each year, to measure the concentration of local banking markets. 7 Ordinarily, proposed mergers are not challenged on competitive grounds unless they would result in a post-merger HHI value of more than 1800 points and an increase in the index of more than 200 points in the relevant banking market. 8 A premise of antitrust enforcement is that banking markets are local in nature, and regulators calculate pro forma HHI values for local banking markets (typically MSAs or non-MSA rural counties) to evaluate the competitive implications of proposed bank mergers. 9 In the past, legal restrictions on branching and high transportation and communications costs made it difficult and costly for the public to obtain services from geographically distant banks. Further, many studies found that deposit interest rates were lower, and loan interest rates were higher, in more concentrated local banking markets, suggesting that concentration was an important determinant of the competitiveness of banking markets. 10 However, branching deregulation, along with advances in informationprocessing and communications technologies, have reduced the cost of obtaining financial services from distant banks and raise the question whether larger geographic areas, such as states, Census regions, or even the nation as a whole, are more relevant for evaluating banking competition. Nonetheless, studies find that (i) households and small businesses, to a substantial degree, continue to obtain their financial services from banks located in their communities 11 and (ii) the structure of local banking markets continues to affect the level of competition within those markets. For example, Hannan and Prager (2004) find that banks that operate in a single MSA or non-MSA county market offer lower deposit interest rates when those markets are more concentrated. However, the study also finds that the relationship between local concentration and deposit interest rates is weaker in markets where the share of banks operating in more than one market is higher. Still, the authors conclude that market structure continues to influence the competitive behavior of banks operating in local markets. Dick (2006) investigates whether the level of bank concentration changed significantly between 1993 and 1999 across MSAs and Census regions to assess the impact on banking market concentration of the removal of most restrictions on interstate branching in 1997. She finds that the mean and median HHI values for MSAs declined slightly between 1993 and 1999, whereas HHI values increased for all nine Census regions, with the percentage increases ranging from 17 percent in the Pacific region to 421 percent in the South Atlantic region.
Local Market Concentration
The patterns that Dick (2006) Dick (2006) , whereas those reported in Panel B are based on data for both commercial banks and savings institutions. 12 The information in Panel A shows that both mean and median HHI values declined by more than 100 points between Further, these trends also continued during 2007-10, despite the financial crisis and recession and resulting wave of bank failures and mergers. Table 2 reports similar information for non-MSA (i.e., "rural") banking markets. Rural banking markets generally are more concentrated than urban markets. For example, the median HHI value for non-MSA counties in 2010 was 3195 (based on data for commercial banks only), whereas the median HHI value for MSAs was by bank (or thrift) holding companies, which may have a controlling interest in more than one bank in a given market. Bank regulators and the DOJ consider common control of multiple banks in a market when evaluating proposed bank mergers. However, in this article no adjustment is made for common control of multiple banks in a market in calculating measures of market concentration, which seems consistent with Dick's (2006) approach. Although failing to adjust for common ownership would tend to lead to understatement of the HHI, on average, holding companies have increasingly tended to merge their multiple bank subsidiaries into a single bank, which lessens this bias in more recent years and, more importantly, would tend to upwardly bias the unadjusted changes in HHI over time. Hence, on average, increases in unadjusted HHI likely overstate the extent to which concentration has increased. Since the observed increases in unadjusted HHI in local banking markets have been small, on average, the average increase in concentration taking account of common control of multiple banks in a market would likely be even smaller. 
Regional Concentration
That the substantial reduction in the number of banks in the United States from the 1990s through 2010 did not increase the average concentration of local banking markets is consistent with the active enforcement of antitrust policy by bank regulators and the DOJ, whose officials generally deny bank merger applications that would substantially increase the concentration of local banking markets. However, antitrust policy is not applied in banking over larger geographic areas, such as Census regions (though, as noted previously, federal law prohibits individual banks from holding more than 10 percent of total U.S. bank deposits, or 30 percent of a state's total deposits, if that level of deposits is obtained through acquisitions of non-failed banks). Dick (2006) finds that HHI values increased substantially between 1993 and 1999 for all nine U.S. Census regions. 
E D E R A L R E S E R V E B A N K O F S T. LO U I S R E V I E W
14 Dick's (2006) data exclude savings institutions and rural market deposits. By contrast, the information reported in Table 3 is based on data that include both MSA and rural deposits. However, HHI values and trends are not qualitatively different from those reported in Table 3 if rural deposits are excluded from the analysis. 
DOMINANT AND FRINGE FIRMS
In addition to changes in market concentration, Dick (2006) also investigates changes over time in the number of "dominant" and "fringe" banks in urban and regional banking markets. She defines dominant banks as the smallest set of banks that jointly hold at least half of a market's total deposits. All other banks in a market are fringe banks. Similarly, regionally dominant banks are those that jointly hold at least half of a region's total deposits. Dick (2006) finds that most urban markets had two or three dominant banks in both 1993 and 1999. Further, the average number of fringe banks fell slightly (from 19 banks to 18 banks), but the median number of fringe banks was 11 banks in both years. Table 4 reports summary statistics on the number of dominant banks across MSAs for 1999 MSAs for , 2006 MSAs for , and 2010 The mean and median number of dominant banks, based on data for only commercial banks or for both commercial banks and savings institutions, changed little between 1999 and 2010. The ranges also varied little across time. Table 4 , the mean number of dominant banks in MSA markets is slightly larger if savings institutions are included in the analysis, but the median remains at three banks from 1999 to 2010 and the mean and median numbers changed little between 1999 and 2010. Furthermore, the number of markets with four or more dominant banks increased from 107 (of 361) in 1999 to 124 (of 366) in 2010 (see Table 5 ). Hence, the results indicate that the decline in the number of banks in the United States since 1999 has not caused the number of dominant banks in most MSA banking markets to fall. Rural (non-MSA) banking markets tend to be more concentrated than urban banking markets. Furthermore, Wheelock (2011) finds that acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors resulted in substantial increases in concentration in some rural banking markets during 2007-10 but no significant increases in any large urban markets. Table 6 reports information on the num- (Table 7) . Thus, as reflected in both HHI values and the distributions of dominant banks, and regardless of whether savings institutions are included in the analysis, the market structure of Regionally Dominant Banks Dick (2006) finds that the number of regionally dominant banks declined by an average of 55 percent across Census regions from 1993 to 1999. Table 8 reports on the number of regionally dominant banks in each Census region for 1999, 2006, and 2010 . As shown in the table, the pattern identified by Dick (2006) continued over the subsequent decade in most regions, especially when savings institutions are included in the analysis (Panel B). 17 The decline in the number of regionally dominant banks was especially pronounced Notably, even in regions with more regionally dominant banks in 1999, the decline in the number of regionally dominant banks during 1999- Dick (2006) also finds that the mean number of banks dominant in both an MSA and its region increased between 1993 and 1999. However, as shown in Table 9 , that trend did not continue past 1999. The mean number of banks dominant at both the MSA and regional levels changed little between 1999 and 2010 in most regions, regardless of whether savings institutions are included in the analysis. Again, there was more variation across regions than over time. MSAs in the New England and Middle Atlantic regions tended to have the smallest numbers of banks that were dominant in both the MSA and its region, whereas the East South Central region generally had the highest average number of such banks.
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IMPACT OF MERGERS ON MARKET CONCENTRATION (2007-10)
The recent financial crisis and recession led to a wave of bank failures and mergers that contributed to the ongoing consolidation of the U.S. banking industry. As shown previously, the average concentration of local banking markets did not increase during 2006-10. This section examines the impact on specific banking markets of unassisted bank mergers during those years. Wheelock (2011) finds that acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors (i.e., banks that already had branches in the markets served by the failed bank) during 2007-10 did not substantially increase concentration in most local banking markets. However, such acquisitions had a substantial impact in a few, mostly rural, banking markets. This section examines the impact on market concentration of acquisitions of non-failed banks by in-market competitors during those years.
Several large unassisted mergers involving banks operating in the same local markets occurred during 2007-10. and Wells Fargo Bank been merged as of that date, and assuming no other differences in the market, the HHI value would have been 1832. Hence, a simple pro forma analysis suggests that the merger would produce a larger increase in market concentration than permitted by DOJ guidelines. However, the divestiture of one of Wachovia Bank's branches in the Santa Cruz market reduced the impact of the merger on market concentration. In the event, the HHI value for the Santa Cruz market rose by only 202 points, from 1295 to 1497, between June 30, 2009, and June 30, 2010 , and hence the market remained only moderately concentrated. 22 The National City Bank and PNC Bank competed directly in 10 banking markets in Florida, Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and both had substantial shares of the Erie and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, markets. In its merger application, PNC proposed to divest several National City Bank branches in both the Pittsburgh and Erie markets. In addition, the Board of Governors determined that a substantial portion of the deposits held by PNC Bank in Pittsburgh were deposits of customers located outside the Pittsburgh market, including various municipalities and governments, and escrow accounts for mortgages and other transactions outside the market. Consequently, the Board determined that, in effect, PNC had a lower effective share of the Pittsburgh Wachovia's subsidiary banks and non-banking companies is available on the Board's website (www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ press/orders/orders20081021a1.pdf). 21 Credit unions are not required to report branch-level deposits data and, hence, ordinarily they are excluded from calculation of market concentration measures, such as the HHI. However, the Board may consider the presence of credit unions in a market when evaluating applications for bank mergers. , 2008 , and June 30, 2009 , and between July 1, 2009 , and June 30, 2010 . Panel E presents summary statistics for all markets where mergers occurred between January 1, 2007, and June 30, 2010 .
The Board of Governors approved many of the bank mergers that occurred between January 1, Hence, the data underlying the summary information reported in Table 11 include mergers that were consummated during the period indicated, regardless of when the mergers were approved. As reported in Panel E, for MSAs, for the entire period January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2010, the mean and median changes in HHI values over the 12-month periods during which one or more bank mergers occurred were 89 and 31 points, respectively. For individual years, the mean (median) changes range from 31 points (-10 points) to 120 points (104 points). The range of changes in HHI values was very wide, from -2289 points to 4685 points across all MSAs where one or more unassisted mergers of banks occurred between January 1, 2007, and June 30, 2010. Of course, mergers are just one cause of changes in HHI values from one year to the next. Other reasons for changes in HHI values include bank failures, de novo entry, reassignment of deposits among a bank's branches, and other changes in the distribution of deposits across banks not associated with mergers.
For rural counties over the entire period, the mean and median changes in HHI values were 286 and 134 points, respectively. For individual years, the mean (median) changes range from 224 (112) points to 440 (175) points. Hence, HHI values tended to increase more in rural counties where mergers occurred than in MSAs. In general, rural banking markets are more concentrated than urban markets. Among rural counties where mergers occurred, the mean HHI value before a merger was 2088 points, compared with 1366 points in MSAs. Many rural banking markets span more than one county, however, and as noted previously, banking regulators may consider the presence of credit unions and other factors that are not reflected in HHI values when evaluating the competitive effects of proposed bank mergers. Nonetheless, it appears that, on average, unassisted bank mergers during 2007-10 had a larger impact on concentration in rural counties than in MSA banking markets; Wheelock (2011) finds a similar result for mergers involving failed banks.
CONCLUSION
The number of U.S. commercial banks and savings institutions declined by 1,011, or about 12 percent, between December 31, 2006, and December 31, 2010. Unassisted mergers of nonfailed banks eliminated 1,002 banks during this period, whereas failures eliminated 324 banks (the chartering of new banks, voluntary liquidations, and other changes resulted in a net addition of 315 banks). The consolidation of the banking industry during 2007-10 continued a trend begun in the mid-1980s. Advances in informationprocessing and other technologies and the resulting economies of scale have encouraged growth in the size of banks, which deregulation of bank branching, first by states and later by the federal government, has facilitated. 26 Banking industry consolidation has been marked by sharply higher shares of U.S. bank deposits held by the largest banks, as well as increased concentration of deposits measured at the level of U.S. Census regions. This article extends prior research on the structure of U.S. banking markets by investigating changes in deposit concentration at both the local and regional levels. It shows that trends toward increased concentration at the regional level in the 1990s continued through 2010. However, concentration of local banking markets has changed 26 Berger (2003) discusses the implications of technological progress for the banking industry, whereas Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) and Wheelock and Wilson (forthcoming) report evidence of significant economies of scale in banking.
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little over time, even during the recent financial crisis and recession when several large bank mergers occurred. Further, the average number of banks holding at least 50 percent of deposits in a region declined over time in most U.S. Census regions, but the number holding at least 50 percent of deposits in local banking markets remained fairly constant over time. Antitrust policy is predicated on the assumption that banking markets are local in nature, and enforcement has helped keep local banking markets from becoming significantly more concentrated.
The article also examines the effects on local market concentration of mergers of banks operating in the same markets. Two of the largest mergers during 2007-10 were the merger of Wachovia Bank with Wells Fargo Bank and the merger of National City Bank with PNC Bank. In approving these applications, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System noted plans to divest local branch offices and other mitigating circumstances that offset pro forma analysis of market concentration levels based on the HerfindahlHirschman Index. Further, the article finds that deposit concentration did not increase to the extent predicted by simple pro forma analysis in markets where these mergers had raised the most serious concerns about their competitive effects.
Finally, the article finds that deposit concentration did not increase substantially, on average, in local banking markets where any unassisted mergers occurred during 2007-10, though rural counties generally saw larger average increases in concentration than urban markets.
Changes in regulation and technology have reduced the cost of obtaining banking services from distant banks. However, many consumers continue to rely exclusively on local banks for financial services and evidence suggests that the pricing of banking services continues to reflect, at least in part, the structure of local banking markets. The recent financial crisis and recession did not alter the trend toward industry consolidation or change patterns of concentration at either the local or regional levels. Antitrust enforcement has ensured that the structures of local banking markets have not changed significantly as a result of unassisted mergers and acquisitions, even as the industry as a whole has consolidated and total U.S. deposits have become increasingly concentrated among the very largest banks. As technology evolves and the costs of obtaining banking services from distant providers fall further, however, local market characteristics may become less relevant for analysis of competition in banking. 
